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Note: Remedying Ineffective Representation by Public
Defenders-An Administrative Alternative to
Traditional Civil Actions
The sixth amendment grants to the accused in criminal
prosecutions "the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."1  The Supreme Court has interpreted this
amendment to guarantee free counsel to indigent defendants 2
and to necessarily require effective representation,3 as well as
representation per se. In Gideon v. Wainwright,4 the Court held
that by incorporation through the fourteenth amendment, the
right to counsel applies to state felony prosecutions. And, in
Argersinger v. Hamlin,5 the Court extended the right to all
prosecutions for offenses punishable by imprisonment.
In order to provide free and effective counsel for indigent
defendants, the states and their political subdivisions have used
either court-appointed private attorneys or permanent staffs of
publicly employed attorneys known as public defenders." The
latter method is generally thought to provide less expensive yet
superior representation 7 and is by far the more common.8
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See generally
Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am.
Cum. L. REy. 601 (1975); Rossman, The Scope of the Sixth Amendment:
Who Is a Criminal Defendant?, 12 Am. Canv. L. REV. 633 (1975).
3. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 57 (1932).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
6. For an excellent discussion and comparison of assigned counsel
and defender systems, see 1 L. SiLVERSTEn, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRImNAL CAsEs IN AmiEcAN STATE CouRTs 15-74 (1965). On the
origins and early development of public defender systems, see R. SxM,
JusTicE m Tna POOR 105-27 (1919).
7. See, e.g., L. SnvEasran, supra note 6, at 63-68; Note, The New
Jersey Public Defender, 5 CoLum. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 153, 157 (1969).
8. See Dahlin, Toward a Theory of the Public Defender's Place in
the Legal System, 19 S.D.L. Rxv. 87, 88 (1974). The importance of the
public defender is further demonstrated by the fact that most criminal
defendants cannot afford private counsel. A study of the New Jersey
public defender system, for example, found that in its first year of
operation the system served approximately 75 percent of all indicted
persons in the state. Note, supra note 7, at 158. See also Benner,
Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense
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Regardless of their relative merits, however, public defender sys-
tems often provide a regrettably poor variety of the "Assistance"
constitutionally guaranteed to their clients.9 Yet at present,
though an indigent defendant who receives ineffective represen-
tation may regain his liberty by petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus, there are, as this Note will demonstrate, no adequate
means for monetarily compensating him for the injury he has
suffered or for deterring future ineffective representation. The
Note therefore poses two goals: prevention of, and appropriate
compensation to indigents for injury caused by, ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. It will evaluate the present possibilities for
judicial attainment of these goals and then propose legislative
reforms.
I. HABEAS COBPUS RELIEF
Theoretically, a defendant claiming denial of his constitu-
tional right to effective counsel can seek relief during the ordi-
nary course of trial and appeal. In practice, a defendant who has
been incompetently represented may lose this chance due to that
very incompetence.' 0 Once finally imprisoned, however, the
defendant can obtain judicial review of his claim via petition
for writ of habeas corpus. The court can grant the writ if it
finds that the petitioner did not receive effective counsel."
The Supreme Court has never enunciated a definition of ef-
fective counsel. The majority rule among the lower courts is
that the performance of the attorney must be so woefully inade-
quate as to shock the conscience of the court and make the pro-
Services, 12 Am. Camn. L. REv. 667, 669 (1975); Wice & Pilgrim, Meeting
the Gideon Mandate: A Survey of Public Defender Programs, 58 JUMICA-
TOE 400, 409 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as
a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
289, 291 (1964). See also note 55, infra.
The indigent's right to effective counsel can be violated by the
actions of counsel during the pretrial, trial, or appellate stages of
criminal proceedings. Salty's v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972)(failure to move to supress evidence); Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d
530 (5th Cir. 1972) (advice to plea bargain); Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d
1308 (6th Cir. 1972) (inadequate investigation of defendant's alibi);
Shiflett v. Virginia, 433 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1970) (failure to advise
defendant of right to appeal).
10. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002 (1971).
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Holloway v. Dutton,
396 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1968); Wilson v. Reagan, 354 F.2d 45, 46 (9th
Cir. 1965).
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ceeding a farce and a mockery of justice.' 2 This test has drawn
severe criticism from many commentators, 13 however, and sev-
eral courts have rejected it for the standard of reasonable care
employed in legal malpractice suits.14 The issue for those
courts is whether the indigent defendant was represented as well
as a paying client would have been by an ordinarily prudent law-
yer skilled in criminal law. This more liberal standard of care
is qualified, however, by the harmless error rule, which requires
that the writ be denied if the court finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that regardless of the ineffectiveness of counsel, the de-
fendant would have been convicted.' 5
It is clear that the habeas corpus action, notwithstanding its
potentially great importance to an imprisoned defendant, is an
12. See, e.g., Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220, 1222 (1st Cir. 1974);
United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Parker
v. United States, 474 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
13. E.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cmn.
L. REV. 1, 28-38 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in
Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 930
& n.14 (1973).
14. E.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214-20 (8th Cir. 1974)
(reasonably adequate investigation); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("customary skill and knowledge which nor-
mally pervails at the time and place"); State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543,
557, 205 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1973); See Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
sel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077, 1079-80 (1973).
15. Among cases applying this approach are: McQueen v. Swen-
son, 498 F.2d 207, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1974); Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421,
424-25 (Alas. 1974); State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974).
Use of the harmless error rule derives from Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967), where the Court held that the trial court's comments
to the jury on the defendant's failure to take the stand were, beyond a
reasonable doubt, harmless error. A footnote in the Chapman opinion,
id. at 23 n.8, indicated that errors infringing upon certain fundamental
rights of the accused could never be harmless, regardless of the facts, and
cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). But the court in
McQueen v. Swenson, supra, attempted to explain away this dictum
by pointing to an "obvious difference between the total absence of
counsel in Gideon and the ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 218.
Arguments against application of the harmless error rule in the
habeas situation center on the rationale that its use requires an inde-
pendent determination of guilt or innocence by the court reviewing the
habeas petition. See generally Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error:
The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MNmN. L. Rnv. 519, 540-42
(1969).
The harmless error rule greatly reduces the potential difference
between the "reasonableness" and "mockery of justice" standards, for
the latter in effect incorporates a requirement that the error in question
be harmful. Thus it is unlikely that the "reasonableness" standard will
appreciably increase the number of writs granted.
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inadequate means of attaining the goals stated above. It neither
deters future incompetence' 6 nor compensates a defendant who
has undergone unnecessary judicial proceedings and incarcera-
tion as a result of his attorney's incompetence.' 7
II. PRESENT POSSIBILITIES FOR PREVENTION OF
AND COMPENSATION FOR INEFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION
A. NEGLIGENcE ACTIONS AGAINST Tirz INDIVIDUAL DEFENDER
A malpractice suit is the traditional civil remedy for inef-
fective representation by counsel. :Prosecution of such a suit re-
quires proof of a duty running from the attorney to his client,
a breach of that duty, and a resulting injury to the client.' 8
The impediments to a malpractice action against a public de-
fender are numerous, however, and of the few such actions that
have been brought, none has succeeded.
The primary barriers to successful malpractice actions in
general are their high cost and the reluctance of professionals
to testify as experts against their fellows.19 In the case of legal
16. Habeas proceedings could conceivably deter ineffective repre-
sentation by threatening harm to the culpable attorney's reputation.
Judges, however, rarely publicize the nmnes of the attorneys implicated
in the proceedings. See Bines, supra note 13, at 969.
17. Professor Bines has suggested a unitary proceeding for con-
sidering both the habeas petition and the alleged negligence of the
attorney. See id. at 974-79. If the outcome of the habeas petition
depended on a finding of ineffectiveness based on a negligence standard,
there would be no need for a second suit. See notes 26-29 infra and
accompanying text. If workable, this approach would enhance both the
likelihood of compensation for the ineffectively represented defendant
and the deterrent effect of habeas proceedings. It is not presently
feasible, however, for most courts still use the "mockery of justice"
standard for habeas corpus review. See note 12 supra and accompany-
ing text.
18. See W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS § 30 (4th ed.
1971) (elements of cause of action in negligence); id. § 32, at 161 (stand-
ard of conduct for attorneys). Most courts have held public defenders
or court-appointed counsel to the standard of skill that is imposed on
privately retained attorneys. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 488
F.2d 1169, 1193 (9th Cir. 1973) (court-appointed counsel); Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (public defender). But
see People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 537, 121 N.E.2d 810, 819 (1954) (holding a
public defender to a higher standard of skill).
19. Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 675, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98,
109 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (dictum); Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malprac-
tice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 257, 265-66
(1970).
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malpractice, there is perhaps also a professional fear of proliferat-
ing malpractice suits. Where the potential plaintiff in a legal
malpractice action is indigent, the cost problem is of course par-
ticularly severe. He cannot, by definition, pay an attorney's
hourly fee, and a contingent-fee arrangement is likely to be pre-
cluded by the small probability of success and by the difficulty
of predicting whether, in the event of success, the damages
awarded for the plaintiff's unnecessary subjection to judicial pro-
ceedings and incarceration would be substantial.2 0
In addition to these practical obstacles, several legal prob-
lems lessen the likelihood of successful prosecution of a malprac-
tice claim against a public defender. One is the doctrine of dis-
cretionary immunity. Based on the rationale that the imposition
upon public officials of unlimited liability for their official ac-
tions would "contribute not to principled and fearless decision-
making but to intimidation" detrimental to the public interest 2'
and deter capable persons from seeking office,22 the doctrine
grants the official a "qualified immunity"2 3 from liability for
discretionary actions taken in good faith.
The courts have split as to whether the doctrine applies to
public defenders. 24 The better view is that it does not. Unlike
prosecutors, judges, and many other public officials,2 5 the de-
20. See note 30 infra.
21. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), quoted in Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
22. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (holding that
school officials are entitled to "a qualified good faith immunity" from
liability for damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
unless they "knew," "reasonably should have known," or intended that
their actions would violate the constitutional rights of the affected stu-
dents); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (holding that "[t]he
immunity of officers of the executive branch of a state government for
their acts is not absolute but qualified . . . depending upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the particular office and the circum-
stances existing at the time of the challenged action").
24. Most of the decisions have involved actions for damages under
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), quoted in note 42 infra.
See, e.g., John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (for immunity);
Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950(1973) (for immunity); United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker, 335 F.
Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1971) (against immunity).
Only one case has considered whether a public defender sued for
malpractice is protected by immunity; it held in the negative. Spring
v. Constantino, - A.2d - (Conn. 1975). But compare Sullens v. Carroll,
446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding a court-appointed attorney
immune from a malpractice claim).
25. The Supreme Court has held that a state judge enjoys immunity
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fender does not exercise his discretion for public ends, except
insofar as it is in the public interest to provide counsel for his
client; and the client's interests are better protected, as the exist-
ence and scope of the traditional malpractice action demonstrate,
if his attorney is liable for negligence than if he is not. More-
over, inasmuch as lawyers in general are subject to liability for
negligence and are accustomed to obtaining insurance against
that eventuality, it can hardly be argued that a grant of im-
munity from such liability is required in order to avoid deterring
capable persons from becoming public defenders.
Two additional impediments to a successful malpractice ac-
tion against a public defender may derive from a previous habeas
corpus proceeding. One is the possible collateral estoppel effect
of a determination in the earlier proceeding that the indigent
was represented with reasonable care. Although the public de-
fender is not a party to the habeas proceeding,26 and would
thus be deprived of due process if held bound by a result adverse
to him, 27 jurisdictions that have abandoned the mutuality re-
quirement of collateral estoppel28 might reasonably conclude
for acts done in the performance of his judicial functions, Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and the lower federal courts have appropriately
extended this rule to prosecutors, e.g., Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581
(3d Cir. 1966) (county prosecutor), and to an Assistant United States
Attorney General, Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
Some courts that have granted immunity to public defenders have
done so on the theory, only vaguely articulated, that it would be inap-
propriate to apply different rules to prosecutors and defenders. E.g.,
Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 950 (1973). But see notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
26. "The writ . .. shall be directed to the person having custody
of the person detained." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970). Thus the proper
respondent is obviously not the public defender, but rather the peti-
tioner's custodian. See R. SOKOL, FEDEIAL HABEAS CoRPus § 7 (2d rev.
ed. 1969).
27. Professor Bines suggests either legislation or use of the declara-
tory judgment to make the public defender a party to habeas proceed-
ings, thus making the findings there binding on later civil or disciplinary
proceedings. Bines, supra note 13, at 976-77.
28. The doctrine of mutuality requires that the party invoking the
benefit of a prior judgment have been a party or privy to the prior
proceeding. This requirement avoids allowing a party to take advantage
of a prior proceeding favorable to hIhn, but escape, on due process
grounds, the effect of a disadvantageous prior proceeding. See 1B J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.412[1] (2d ed. 1974).
Those courts that have departed to some extent from the mutuality
doctrine have most often done so by allowing the defensive use of a
prior judgment against a plaintiff who was a party to the prior suit.
See generally Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STEA. L. REv. 281 (1957). The rationale is that
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that the indigent had his day in court in that proceeding and
therefore is precluded from retrying the issue of ineffective-
ness.
29
Regardless of its possible collateral estoppel effect, a prior
habeas corpus proceeding could also affect the damages element
of the malpractice action. Only where the habeas court ordered
a retrial that resulted in acquittal of the indigent defendant
would the defendant be clearly entitled to damages.30 Where
the habeas court found that the errors committed by the indi-
gent's lawyer were harmless,31 the indigent defendant would ap-
parently be precluded from proving damages, for the court hear-
ing the malpractice claim could award damages only if it inde-
pendently reconsidered and denied the indigent defendant's
guilt.32  Similarly, conviction on retrial would apparently pre-
clude proof of damages. 33 Thus, regardless of his actual guilt
or innocence, the indigent defendant may be prevented by a prior
habeas proceeding from obtaining damages in a malpractice suit.
the plaintiff has already had his day in court. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v.
Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934); J. MOORE, supra.
29. This seems to be the ground of decision in Lamore v. Laughlin,
159 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1947), where the court upheld a summary judg-
ment on the ground that plaintiff's "allegation of dereliction" was
answered by the findings of fact in the habeas proceeding.
Where the prior habeas corpus proceeding employed the "mockery
of justice" standard, see text accompanying notes 12-15 supra, even those
courts that have abandoned the mutuality requirement ought not to
give collateral estoppel effect to a determination adverse to the indigent
defendant. This follows from the more stringent burden of proof
embodied in that standard.
30. In this case the damages award would be similar to awards for
false imprisonment. It would represent lost time, physical discomfort,
and any resulting mental or physical injury. See W. PRossER, HANDBooK
OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 11 (4th ed. 1971). Cases in which such awards
have been computed are rare, since immunity doctrines have usually
barred recovery. See Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously
Confined by the State, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1091, 1098-1107. See also notes
21-25 supra and accompanying text. But see Tatum v. Morton, 386 F.
Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (D.D.C. 1974) ($100 in § 1983 suit for brief incarcera-
tion following false arrest); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302,
1318-19 (E.D. Va. 1973) ($15,000 recovery in § 1983 suit for pain and
suffering during confinement, but recovery for six years lost wages
denied as "speculative").
31. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
32. Although a finding of harmless error in the habeas proceeding
arguably precludes a finding of injury in a subsequent malpractice suit,
it ought not to do so in a subsequent action based on section 1983 or on
the theory that the deprivation of the constitutional right is itself an
injury. See notes 74-75 infra and accompanying text.
33. See generally 12 Am. JuE. 2d Damages §§ 30-44 (1965). This
assumes that credit would be given for time already served.
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B. NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC DEFER OFFICE
Actions against either the defender's superior or the public
defender office, in its capacity as a unit of state or local govern-
ment, are possibilities in addition to suits against the individual
defender. In suing the defender's superior, a plaintiff would
need to allege negligence in supervision, training, or the like.34
Again, however, such a suit has never been won. As with a neg-
ligence action against the defender himself, the cost of suing and
the reluctance of many attorneys to bring suit or testify against
their fellows are severe practical obstacles. In addition, several
considerations suggest that the plaintiff's case would be difficult
to prove. First, it might be difficult to establish a duty to train
a public defender for the special demands of the job. Although
some state defender statutes could be construed to impose such
a duty,35 none appears to specifically mandate a course of in-
struction for defenders beyond that required for all attorneys. 3
Second, a plaintiff would have little chance of demonstrating
negligent supervision unless a history of incompetence by the in-
dividual defender had been ignored.37 Third, it would be diffi-
cult to prove that the supervisor's failure to train the defender
was the legal cause of whatever injury allegedly befell the plain-
tiff.
Furthermore, it is possible that a superior would be shielded
from liability by discretionary immunity. The policies underly-
34. A plaintiff could rely on cases holding other government offi-
cials subject to suit on grounds of negligent training or supervision of
subordinates. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 363-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). Additional cases are cited in Carter, supra
at 363 n.12.
35. The Minnesota Public Defender Act, for example, declares that
the state public defender "shall supervise the training of all state
[assistant] and district public defenders, and may establish a training
course for such purpose." MriZNN. STAT. § 611.25 (1974).
36. Numerous defender statutes do require a number of years'
legal experience as a job qualification, especially for the chief public
defender position. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. AN. §§ 54-80, 80a(Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-15-2 (1969) (five years for
chief). Some states further require prior experience in the field of
criminal law. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 341-1(2) (b) (1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5252(b) (1974). In addition, many states require
that the chief defender be chosen, or at least approved, by special com-
mittees of lawyers, judges, and laymen. See, e.g., MnIN. STAT. ANN. §§
483.02, 611.23 (1974) (chief defender chosen by Judicial Council, which
is composed of several judges, lawyers, and gubernatorial appointees).
37. Cf. Moon v. Winfield, 368 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (police
chief may be liable for negligent failure to dismiss police officer with
history of poor conduct).
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ing that doctrine 8 would appear to be better served by granting
immunity to the supervisor than to the individual defender.
First, because the supervisor's discretionary functions must serve
the interest of the general public, and especially that of potential
indigent defendants, in the effective and economical administra-
tion of the public defender office, arguably immunity is necessary
to promote "fearless and principled decision-making." Second,
the imposition of liability upon the supervisor could deter cap-
able attorneys from seeking such a position, because that liability
would exceed the ordinary malpractice liability to which the at-
torney is accustomed.
An action against the public defender office alleging inade-
quate funding or staffing would face comparable difficulties.
The major hurdle would lie in either the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which bars suits against the state and its agencies,
or the analogous doctrine of local immunity, which bars suits
against the political subdivisions of the state.3 9 Where these doc-
trines still exist,40 negligence suits against the government are
barred, although several courts and legislatures have carved out
an exception from immunity where it can be shown that the chal-
lenged decisions are of a nondiscretionary rather than a discre-
tionary or policy-making nature.41 Because the government is
constitutionally mandated to provide effective counsel to indigent
defendants, its failure to do so by inadequately funding or staff-
ing the defender office could be considered nondiscretionary, for
it has no choice but to provide the requisite funds and staff.
Nonetheless, in view of their many difficulties, malpractice suits
against either the public defender office or its supervisors cannot
now be considered viable means of attaining the desired reforms.
C. AcTiois AGAINST THE INDmDUAL DEFENDER UNDER
SEcTION 1983 OF THE CiVm RIGHTS ACT
Another possible avenue of recovery for the indigent defend-
ant claiming to have received ineffective counsel is a suit for
38. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
39. 3 K. DAVIS, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 25.01-25.17 (1958);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 975-87 (4th ed.
1971).
40. For a listing of the current status of state and local immunity
in all 50 states, see RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A, special
note at 12-22 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). In Minnesota, the supreme
court has recently abolished sovereign immunity. See note 97 infra.
41. For a thorough discussion of discretionary functions and
government immunity, see Note, The Discretionary Exception and
Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal, 52 Mr-x. L. REv. 1047 (1968).
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damages against the public defender under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act.42 To succeed with such an action, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defender was a state officer-a "per-
son" who acts "under color of state law"; that the plaintiff was
deprived of his constitutional right to effective counsel; and that
the defender is unable to claim immunity from liability. No such
action has yet succeeded.
Some courts have dismissed section 1983 actions against pub-
lic defenders (and against court-appointed counsel) on the
ground that section 1983 "was never intended as a vehicle for
prosecuting malpractice suits."48  This conclusion is not without
reason. A plaintiff represented by private counsel would have
no remedy under the Civil Rights Act;44 why should a court
strain to provide the indigent defendant with an additional
theory of relief? One answer might be that a malpractice action
requires that the plaintiff establish injury as a part of his
claim,)4 5 while section 1983 has been held to empower courts to
grant nominal or punitive damages even when no actual damages
can be shown.40  Thus, if an indigent defendant could proceed
under section 1983, he would need to prove only a duty on the
part of the public defender and a breach thereof. Punitive dam-
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
43. O'Brien v. Colbath, 465 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
Fletcher v. Hook, 446 F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1971) ("a tort claim against a
professional man for malpractice 'is not cognizable under the Civil
Rights Act' "); Smith v. Clapp, 436 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1970). But cf.
McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir.
1971). Although speaking with reference to a private attorney, the
Supreme Court has advised that "[i]f an attorney's conduct falls sub-
stantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client's
remedy is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice." Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962) (emphasis added).
44. Arguments that attorneys, as "officers of the court," act under
color of state law have uniformly been rejected. See, e.g., Steward v.
Meeker, 495 F.2d 669, 670 (3d Cir. 1972); Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp.
1250, 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45. See note 18 supra.
46. See United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807,
811 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ($1,000 nominal damages allowed on theory that the
"injury is presumed to flow from the deprivation [of constitutional
rights] itself."); Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd
463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972) (approving instructions to jury allowing it
to award nominal or punitive damages); Washington v. Official Court
Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (nominal and punitive
damages recoverable even in absence of actual damages).
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ages, however, have generally been granted only where the viola-
tion of constitutional rights was "willful or malicious"; 47 and
nominal damages, of course, are only that.
At any rate, a majority of the courts that have considered
claims under section 1983 have concluded that public defenders
do not act under color of state law.48 Integral to this conclusion
is the belief that the defender has an affirmative duty to protect
his client's interests and hence is not controlled by the state.
This view rests on the premise that the public defender's role
is analogous to that of the private criminal defense attorney.49
Those courts that have reached a contrary result have focused
on the similarities between the roles of the defender and the
prosecutor. Since prosecutors have been found to act under color
of state law,5" the same would thus apply to defenders. 51
Ironically, a continued application of the prosecutorial analogy
has led these courts to ultimately reject the plaintiff's claim on
the basis of discretionary immunity.52
47. See Stolberg v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees for State Col-
leges of Conn., 474 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Wilson v.
Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9, 15 (W.D. Pa. 1971), affd 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.
1972).
48. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker, 335 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D.N.J. 1971).
Similarly, appointed counsel and voluntary defenders have usually been
held not to act under color of state law. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Schlach-
ter, 389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968) (appointed counsel); Vance v.
Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D.N.C. 1968) (appointed counsel);
Peake v. County of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 853, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(voluntary defender).
49. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the
public defender's "professional duties and responsibilities toward his
clients are identical in all respects to any other . . . attorney whether
privately retained or court-appointed." Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d
1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 1972).
50. See, e.g., Hampton v. Chicago 484 F.2d 602, 607-08 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d
533, 535 (9th Cir. 1965).
51. See, e.g., John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973); Brown
v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1047 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950
(1973).
52. See, e.g., John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973);
Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973). For criticism of the prosecutorial analogy as
regards immunity, see Comment, Liability of Court-Appointed Defense
Counsel for Malpractice in Federal Court Prosecutions, 57 IowA L. REV.
1420, 1424 (1972); note 25 supra and accompanying text.
One commentator has argued that "an indigent client should have
a cause of action directly from the sixth amendment, irrespective of
the doctrine of immunity . . . ." Note, The Right of the Indigent Client
to Sue His Court-Appointed Attorney for Malpractice, 33 LA. L. REV.
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It appears, then, that an indigent defendant seeking mone-
tary damages from a public defender has even less chance of suc-
cess under section 1983 than with a malpractice action.
D. AcTIONS AGAINST THE PuBLic DEFENDER OFFICE UNDER
SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
A further potential, but relatively untested, theory of relief
for ineffective representation by public defenders is an action
under section 1983 seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against
the public defender office. 3 This theory has been attempted
only once. In Gardner v. Luckey,5 4 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit dismissed, as not presenting a case or contro-
versy, a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought
by three convicted indigent defendants, who claimed that their
rights to effective counsel had been denied because of inadequate
funding of the public defender office and the excessive caseloads
of its attorneys.55 The court reasoned that because the plain-
740, 745 (1973). This argument, based on Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. of Narc., 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is un-
persuasive. In Bivens, the Supreme Court established an analogue to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by permitting the plaintiff to sue federal agents who
had allegedly violated his fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Since section 1983 already provides a
remedy against state officers, such as most public defenders, there is no
need to predicate jurisdiction, as in Bivens, directly on the Constitution.
See, e.g., Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Anderson v. Reynolds, 342 F. Supp. 102, 109 (D. Utah 1972).
Moreover, even if section 1983 could be so circumvented, there is no
reason to believe that a different immumity would then cloak the state
officer. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bur. of Narc., 456 F.2d 1339, 1342-48 (2d Cir. 1972), where on remand
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the qualified good
faith immunity standard to the federal agents.
53. As with negligence actions against the public defender office,
see notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text, damage suits brought
against the office under section 1983 are likely to be barred by the
doctrines of sovereign and local immunity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974). Equitable relief, however, even if it necessitates the
spending of large amounts of money, is not barred by those doctrines.
Id. at 667-68.
54. 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. The plaintiffs alleged that because of the inadequate funding
and excessive caseloads the public defenders had failed "to consult with
those whom they were appointed to represent, to advise each indigent
of his legal rights, to provide adequate investigation of the availability
of factual and legal defenses, and to assign a specific attorney to defend
the indigent." Id. at 713.
The problem of inadequate funding has been described by several
commentators. A survey done by Silverstein indicated that 22 of 46
defenders and 31 of 75 judges interviewed found funding to be inade-
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tiff's future need for services of the public defender office was
speculative, they lacked the present injury necessary for relief.56
The court added that even had the case or controversy require-
ment been met, it would have denied relief in order to avoid
"exactly the sort of intrusive and unworkable supervision of state
judicial processes condemned [by the Supreme Court]," 57 and
that the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,5 s which prevents federal
courts from enjoining state criminal prosecutions, might also
have independently barred relief.
It is possible that both the holding and the two dicta of this
case can be successfully challenged or avoided. The case or con-
troversy problem would be avoided by a suit brought while the
indigent defendants were still being represented by the allegedly
ineffective counsel.59 The first dictum, that judicial supervision
of public defender offices would be unworkable, was questionable
when uttered 0 and has been rendered more so by a recent dictum
quate. I L. S V~sTEn, DEFENSE oF TH POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN
AMEnRcAN STATE CouRTs 43 (1965). For other examples of insufficient
funding and its potential effects on representation, see Benner, supra
note 8, at 679-80; Kittel, Defense of the Poor: A Study in Public Par-
simony and Private Poverty, 45 IND. L.J. 90, 92-93 (1969); Note, supra
note 7, at 158-59.
Excessive caseloads are also often cited. A study of the Denver
Public Defender Office found that individual defenders completed, on
average, more than 25 aggravated robbery and 80 driving-under-the-
influence cases per month. This resulted in work weeks in excess of
60 hours and inevitable lapses in the quality of representation. See Note,
The Right to Effective Counsel: A Case Study of the Denver Public
Defender, 50 DENVER L.J. 45, 61-64 (1973).
56. 500 F.2d at 714-15. The court relied on O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974), also a suit for injunctive relief under section 1983;
there, the Supreme Court held that absent an allegation of continuing
injury, no case or controversy was presented by allegations that a
magistrate and a judge had denied plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
57. 500 F.2d at 715 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)).
58. 401U.S. 37 (1971).
59. A problem not mentioned by the Gardner court is that the
controversy could be considered mooted if the indigent defendant was
convicted and thus ceased to be represented by his public defender
before the section 1983 action was decided. In recognition of this type
of problem, however, the Supreme Court has held that mootness will not
be held to preclude suit where the conduct complained of is likely to be
often repeated, yet likely to evade full judicial review. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) ("pregnancy provides a classic justification for
* . . nonmootness"). Moreover, since suits for injunctive relief under
section 1983 will be usually brought as class actions, any mootness
problem can probably be avoided. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-402
(1975); Wallace v. McDonald, 369 F. Supp. 180, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
60. The court based this dictum, as it did its holding, on O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The intrusive effect of an injunction
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of the Supreme Court in a case comparable to Gardner.,' And
the second dictum ignores an exception to the Younger doctrine
-that allows federal intervention if the alleged constitutional
threat cannot be eliminated by the defense of a single state prose-
cution.62  That exception seems certainly applicable to the
broad threat presented by the inadequate funding of a public
defender office.
Thus, it appears that a successful suit under section 1983 to
compel the public defender office to provide effective representa-
tion has not been precluded. At present, however, the various
unanswered questions surrounding such an action render it a
dubious vehicle for reform of public defender systems. More-
over, even if successful, the action would only ensure adequate
funds and staff for the defender office; it would not otherwise
deter ineffective representation, nor would it compensate the in-
adequately represented client.
requiring that a public defender office be adequately funded and staffed
would seem to be much less than that "condemned" in O'Shea, however.
The O'Shea action was aimed at redressing the allegedly prejudicial
courtroom practices of a magistrate and a judge; thus the enforcement
of an injunction would have required at least periodic monitoring of
the defendants. 414 U.S. at 500. In comparison, an injunction forcing a
public defenders office to meet easily quantifiable prerequisites to
effective representation would seem well within a court's proper role.
61. In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated,
95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), a former patient in a state mental hospital sought
damages under section 1983 on the ground that persons involuntarily
committed to such hospitals in civil proceedings have a constitutional
right to receive treatment or be released. The circuit court (a different
panel than the one that decided Gardner) and the Supreme Court both
indicated in dictum that promulgation of standards defining consti-
tutionally adequate treatment is within judicial competence. 493 F.2d
at 25-26; 95 S. Ct. at 2493 n.10.
A further indication that judicial supervision of the sort requested
in Gardner may be attainable is Wallace v. McDonald, 369 F. Supp. 180
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). In that case indigent defendants detained by the state
sought an injunction under section 1983 to prevent state judges from
assigning to legal aid attorneys more cases than they could effectively
handle. In denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, the court noted
that it had the power to deal with day-to-day operations of state
agencies to the extent necessary to remedy violations of the Civil Rights
Act. Id. at 187. Similar examples of the use of injunctive relief are
found in cases holding that jail conditions must meet judicially defined
standards in order to avoid violating the constitutional rights of inmates.
See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1974), and cases
cited therein.
62. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 53, 54 (1971). See, e.g.,
Wallace v. McDonald, 369 F. Supp. 180, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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E. INHERENT POWER OF Tm COURT
An alternative to a section 1983 action for an injunction to
compel the expenditure of funds necessary to operate an effective'
public defender service may lie in the inherent power of the
court. In the leading case, Knox County Council v. State ex rel.
McCormick,63 the defendant County Council had refused to
grant fees to the court-appointed defenders. After noting that
the indigent defendants had a constitutional right to representa-
tion, the court observed that it possessed the inherent power to
require any act reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice. 4 Proper administration of justice required that counsel
be awarded compensation. Therefore, the court, exercising its
inherent power, ordered the award out of the county treasury. 65
More recently, the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia brought a mandamus action to compel the mayor
and city council to appropriate funds for the operation of their
court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate,66 concluded that "the Judiciary must pos-
sess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of
those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry
out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to
administer Justice." 7 The court held that its power could be
exercised without regard to city economic and budgetary factors.
These applications of the inherent power concept offer a po-
tential means of ensuring the adequate funding and staffing of
public defender offices. Surely the funds and personnel required
to provide constitutionally adequate representation can be con-
sidered "reasonably necessary" for the proper administration of
justice. 68 Nonetheless, no suit has advanced such a theory.
Moreover, of course, adequately funded and staffed public de-
fender offices would be no guarantee of effective representation
for indigent defendants.
63. 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940).
64. Id. at 511, 29 N.E.2d at 413.
65. Id. at 515-16, 29 N.E.2d at 414. For a review of comparable
cases, see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 819 (1968).
66. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
67. Id. at 52, 274 A.2d at 197 (emphasis in original).
68. The advisability of using the inherent power concept has been
sharply criticized on the ground that it constitutes a dangerous infringe-
ment on the legislative sphere. See Comment, State Court Assertion of
Power to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
1187 (1972). For a more favorable view, see Note, Inherent Power and
Administrative Court Reform, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 133 (1975).
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES
It is apparent that the goals of deterring ineffective represen-
tation by public defenders and compensating indigent defendants
for injury caused by such representation are not likely to be ac-
complished by the civil actions presently available to indigents.
The proposal advanced here is the creation of state administrative
agencies vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel and with supervisory powers to im-
plement training programs and promote the coordination and ef-
ficiency of public defender offices. These reforms must be
coupled with an increase in the funding of public defender offices
sufficient to attract high caliber attorneys and eliminate exces-
sive caseloads.
A. ADmINIsTRATIvE JURIsDIcTIoN OVim CLAIMS OF
INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF CouNsEL
An administrative scheme for adjudicating claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel must be designed to eliminate the major
problems presently encountered by indigents bringing such
claims. An appropriate model for structural reform is available
in certain Western European systems of judicial administra-
tion.69 Under those systems, the judge conducts the trial. The
role of witnesses is to serve the court in ascertaining the facts
rather than to serve one of the parties in establishing its version
of the facts. Testimony is given informally, with a minimum
of interruption and little use of evidentiary rules. Expert wit-
nesses are neutral parties called by the court.
This structure seems well suited to the problem at hand.
The burden of initiating the proceeding would remain on the in-
digent. Thereafter, however, he would merely be required to
present his evidence in an informal fashion, normally without
the aid of counsel. The tribunal would play the active role, at-
tempting to establish the facts through examination of both the
indigent defendant and his allegedly ineffective public defender.
Composed primarily or solely of lawyers, the tribunal would
rarely need expert witnesses, for its own expertise would permit
it to evaluate the validity of the plaintiff's claims. The rules
69. See Reiss, Lessons in Judicial Administration from European
Countries, 37 J. Am. JuDICATuRE Soc'y 102, 104-107 (1953) (general
description of procedure under Austrian Code). See also Kaplan, von
Mehren, & Schaefer, Phases of German. Civil Procedure I, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 1193 (1958).
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of evidence could be substantially abandoned, as is often the case
in administrative proceedings 70 After considering all the avail-
able evidence, the tribunal could determine whether the acts
complained of constituted professional negligence,71 whether
the indigent was injured,72 and what would be the appropriate
monetary award73
The grant of a monetary award should not depend on a dem-
onstration of a causal relation between the inadequate represen-
tation and the conviction of the indigent defendant; it should
only require a finding that the indigent was not represented with
reasonable care. Elimination of any requirement of proof that
the inadequate representation caused conventional injury to the
indigent defendant is important for two reasons. First, it seems
essential that the constitutional right to counsel not vary with
guilt or innocence. The right attaches before any determination
of guilt or innocence,74 when the presumption of innocence is
still in effect. Thus, whatever its precise dimensions, the entitle-
ment embodied in the right should not be subject to after-the-
fact modification by a habeas corpus court. On this rationale,
moreover, deprivation of the right-whether harmful or harm-
less-is an injury for which compensation is appropriate.75
70. 1 J. WIwom, Ev mnc. §§ 4(a), (b) (3d ed. 1940); cf. Comment,
Evidence-Rules of Evidence in Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, and Grand
Jury Proceedings, 58 Micn. L. Rsv. 1218 (1960).
71. The negligence standard is preferable to the "shock the con-
science" standard still used by a majority of courts to evaluate petitions
for writs of habeas corpus based on claims of ineffective representation
by counsel. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. On the other
hand, it might even be argued that "fault" is irrelevant in this con-
text-that regardless of fault, a person who is denied effective repre-
sentation has been deprived of a constitutional right and is entitled
therefore to compensation. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
73. In awarding damages, the administrative tribunal hearing a
legal malpractice claim would be performing a function similar to that
of a state torts claim board. For example, in Minnesota the State Claims
Commission has jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, "claims and demands
against the state or any of its agencies, which the state in its sovereign
capacity should in equity and good conscience discharge and pay."
Mnnm. STAT. § 3.735(1) (1974). The proposed tribunals would also
function like typical state torts claims board in that the latter conduct
their hearings informally, without the common-law rules of evidence,
and often without aid of counsel. See, e.g., id. § 3.76.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
75. This notion is supported by the language of section 1983, see
note 42 supra, and by the cases that have construed that statute to
allow the award of nominal damages without regard to conventional
injury. See note 46 supra. Theoretical consistency appears to require
that an indigent defendant found innocent by a jury be able to appear
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Second, to require causation of injury would largely defeat the
goal of deterrence by allowing either operation of the harmless
error rule or conviction of the defendant upon retrial to preclude
the imposition of liability upon the public defender, his superiors,
or the public defender office.7 6
While a finding of negligent representation could serve as a
basis for agency disciplinary action against the defender, the
monetary award might be drawn from a fund provided by the
state government.77  Such a funding scheme would constitute a
before the tribunal and raise a claim of ineffective representation. It
is unlikely, however, that a tribunal would allow more than a minimum
award. See note 79 infra. Furthermore, a legislature might not em-
power the tribunal to award any compensation in such a case, not-
withstanding the theoretical inconsistency.
76. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra. It should be noted
that disciplinary actions are occasionally brought against attorneys
found to have ineffectively represented their clients. See, e.g., United
States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970) (fine); In re Smith, 365
IIl. 11, 5 N.E.2d 227 (1936) (censure); In re McDermit, 96 N.J. 17, 114 A.
144 (1921) (disbarment). The infrequency of such proceedings no
doubt renders their deterrence value virtually nil.
77. An obvious alternative to establishing a special state fund
would be to require the individual public defender to appear before the
tribunal as a defendant. However, while the ready availability of an
effective action directly against the public defender would perhaps
better deter poor representation, creation of such an action would be
beset with difficulties. Even if the tribunal were able to award damages
against the public defender, he would probably be entitled to a de novojury trial under most state constitutions. See, e.g., Landgraf v. Ells-
worth, 267 Minn. 323, 126 N.W.2d 766 (1964) (Minnesota constitution
"preserves unimpaired the right of jury trial as it existed by the laws of
the territory at the time our state constitution was adopted, and such
right is neither extended nor limited." See generally Note, The Right to
Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1952). The
new trial would give rise to the practical difficulties which inhere in con-
ventional malpractice suits-the need for the indigent defendant to
obtain legal assistance to bring the suit and expert witnesses to prove
his case. Although these difficulties might be alleviated by a statutory
requirement that the administrative tribunal assist the indigent defend-
ant at trial, see Documentary Supplement, Medical-Legal Screening
Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13
Wm. & MARY L. REv. 695, 719 (1972), it would be incongruous to estab-
lish an expert tribunal whose judgments could be reversed by a jury.
Furthermore, an action seeking relief from a public defender would
lack several advantages inherent in an action seeking relief from a
special state fund. The latter method not only ensures that some award
will be available-that is, that the defendant is not judgment proof-
but it also affords relief to the indigent defendant whose ineffective
representation was arguably caused by circumstances beyond the control
of an individual defender, such as inadequate staffing or funding.
Finally, it is unlikely that an action directly against the public
defender would actually be a greater deterrent. In anticipation of
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waiver of immunity by the state. Awards granted could be lim-
ited to a miximum amount, however, as is commonly done by
states that provide statutory exceptions to their sovereign im-
munity.7 8 Conversely, a minimum statutory award could also
be required, as is already done in several other contexts.7 9 The
purpose of a minimum award would be to provide a necessary
incentive to indigents who feel that they have received poor rep-
resentation to bring their claims to the attention of the tribu-
nal.80 The minimum should be low enough, however, to dis-
courage frivolous claims. The maximum award should be high
enough to allow for substantial compensation in appropriate
cases.
possible liability, defenders undoubtedly would purchase insurance to
protect themselves. Deterrence through disciplinary sanctions such as
suspensions, loss of tenure (where tenure exists, see note 87 infra), or
dismissal would be equally available whether the action were brought
directly against the defender or the state. But c.f. Sharood v. Hatfield,
296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 725 (1973) (holding that the power to regu-
late the practice of law rests solely with the judiciary). Of course,
the statutory framework could provide that an award to the indigent
vests in the state a right of subrogation. Neither the decision of the
tribunal nor the fact that an award has been granted or denied should
be admissible in evidence in any action brought against the public
defender, however, including an action by the state on its subrogation
claim. Compare Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act, IVINN.
STAT. §§ 299B.10, .14 (1974).
Regardless of the system selected, questions would arise as to the
finality of the administrative determination and as to whether use of the
tribunal by the indigent claimant would constitute an election of rem-
edies, barring other civil actions. These questions require additional
consideration and are beyond the scope of this Note.
78. See Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined
by the State, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1091, 1111 & n.160 (1970). For other
examples of statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity, see Note, An
Insurance Program to Effectuate Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunity,
26 U. FLA. L. REv. 89, 99-102 (1973).
79. For example, a section of the Truth in Lending Act allows for
the recovery of $100 minimum statutory damages for nondisclosure in a
consumer credit transaction. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (2) (A) (Supp. Feb.
1975). For cases discussing the purpose of this provision, see Shields v.
First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 447-78 (D. Ariz. 1972); Ratner v. Chem-
ical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
For a typical statutory damages provision with a more limited impact,
see MmN. STAT. § 550.18 (1974) (officer selling property at execution
sale without giving proper notice, subject to $100 statutory damages).
Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1970);
Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MV!N.
L. REv. 493, 515 (1955) (discussion of liquidated damages statutes).
80. Although lawyers and judges should report instances of in-
competent representation to bar associations for disciplinary action, see
ABA CODE or PROFESSIONAL REspoxsmILITY DR 6-101 (1974), it is
obvious that this will be done in only the most egregious cases.
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B. FINANCING AND ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEMS
Establishing administrative review mechanisms designed to
compensate the ineffectively defended indigent and to discipline
his attorney will not alone greatly improve the quality of public
defender representation. An essential element of any reform di-
rected to that end is adequate financing for the public defender
office. 81 The low starting salaries presently offered to prospec-
tive defenders fail to attract enough experienced and talented
attorneys, and the narrow range of salaries tends to cause a high
office turnover rate.8 2  Common sense and equity dictate that
public defender salaries should be at least equal to those of prose-
cutors, but in many states they are not.83 Sufficient funding
would also decrease the enormous caseloads presently imposed
on many defenders.8 4  Few lawyers can be effective without
adequate time to prepare a case.
Moreover, intensive training programs and continuing legal
education courses should be required of all public defenders.
Numerous authorities have suggested that such training pro-
grams should be required for all trial lawyers, both civil and
criminal.8 5 Given the high value placed on personal liberty by
a free society, nowhere is this need for specialized training more
81. See note 55 supra with respect to the problems created by
inadequate funding of public defender offices.
82. Some statutes fix maximum defender salaries at a low level,
see, e.g., DEL. CODE AwN. tit. 29, § 4603 (Cum. Supp. 1970) ($10,000 for
chief defender), others are somewhat higher, see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31.020(2) (Cum Supp. 1974) ($27,000 for chief defender); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5252(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Most permit the
governing body, usually the county board, to fix the level of compensa-
tion up to a set maximum. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 137.2
(1962); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.26.0e0 (1973). A recent survey of 70
municipal public defender offices has fcund the average defender salary
to be $13,000. Wice & Pilgrim, Meeting the Gideon Mandate: A Survey
of Public Defenders Programs, 58 JUDIcATURE 400, 403 (1975).
83. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 5605 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975)
(salary not to exceed 80 percent of that paid state's attorneys); WAsH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 36.26.060 (Supp. 1974) (salary not to exceed that of
county prosecutor). But see, e.g., ALiA. CODE tit. 13, § 260(21) (Cum.
Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29,1804 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
257.23 (2m) (1974) (parity between defenders and prosecutors required).
For a detailed discussion of public defender compensation, see Benner,
Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense
Services, 12 A-m. Cnmv. L. REv. 667, 681-84 (1975).
84. See note 55 supra.
85. See, e.g., Burger, Remarks on Trial Advocacy: A Proposition,
7 WAsHaum L.J. 15 (1967).
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necessary than in the defense of the criminally accused.8 6 Few
defenders are presently required to participate in such pro-
grans8 7
C. ADAPTABILITY OF PRESENT PuBLIc DEFENDER SYSTEMS
TO PROPOSED REFORMS
The suggested reforms should be administered by a single
body responsible both for improving the quality of representation
by public defenders and for hearing client grievances. It may
be helpful to focus on how these reforms could be implemented
under an existing state defender system.88
The office of state public defender in Minnesota is a legisla-
tively created government agency,8 9 with one appointed chief
public defender, who has a conditional power to employ as many
assistant defenders as he deems necessary 0 Assistant state
public defenders are all unclassified employees, having no tenure
and receiving a maximum annual salary of $12,500.91 Above
86. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIIVIINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
Am GoALs, CouRTS 284 (1973).
87. See Benner, supra note 83, at 681.
Grants of tenure may be an additional means for improving
defender services. Tenure would afford the defender a greater sense ofjob security and perhaps a long-range commitment to his position. It
would also insulate the defender from any fear that his discharge might
accompany political turnover in the defender office hierarchy. Of course,
these benefits must be balanced against the risk that a tenure system
would allow for "deadwood" to accumulate in the office. This problem
could perhaps be mitigated, however, by the use of disciplinary sanctions
such as suspension or even loss of tenure. See note 77 supra.
88. Several states' public defender statutes already provide for
administrative review of public defender performance. Some do so by
subjecting the actions of public defenders to review by existing admin-
istrative bodies, such as state civil service systems or judicial misconduct
review boards. See, e.g., Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 31.020(4) (Cum. Supp.
1974) (assistant defenders covered by state merit system); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 600.025 (Vernon 1975) (chief circuit defenders subject to disci-
pline in same manner as judges); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-66, -375, -376,
-466 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (chief and assistant defenders subject to
removal by Judicial Standards Commission). One state has even
established an autonomous commission governing internal disciplinary
matters. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-289 (Supp. 1975). These statutes
do not provide for the hearing of client grievances, however.
89. Mm. STAT. § 611.22 (1974). Minnesota also provides for a
district public defender system. Id. § 611.26.
90. Subject to approval by the State Judicial Council. Id. § 611.24.
In most states, the chief defender must obtain the approval of county
boards. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. Ai. § 11-586 (A) (Supp. 1975); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 336A.5 (2) (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.26.060
(2) (Supp. 1974).
91. Mhw. STAT. § 611.24 (1974).
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the public defender office is the Minnesota State Judicial Council,
a body composed primarily of judges and lawyers92 charged
with studying "the organization, rules and methods of procedure
and practice of the judicial system of the state, and. . . all mat-
ters relating to the administration of said system. '9 3 In addi-
tion, the Council is responsible for appointing the chief pub-
lic defender, fixing his salary within a given range, 94 and approv-
ing all of his appointments.9 5 Statutory bodies with general
supervisory powers similar to those of the Council exist in a num-
ber of other states96 and are in an excellent position to adminis-
ter the reforms suggested.
A state judicial council, together with the state bar associa-
tion, could, under a general legislative mandate, establish the pre-
cise procedures for hearing indigents' claims of ineffective repre-
sentation and appoint lawyers within the state to sit on the ad-
ministrative tribunals.9 7 Such tribunals, after hearing a claim,
could report their findings to the council for appropriate
disciplinary action. An appropriation could be made to the coun-
cil budget to satisfy any claim determined by the tribunal to be
owed by the state to the indigent defendant.
Because it is possible that judges who hear criminal cases
may develop prejudices for and against particular defenders, both
the tribunals and the state judicial council (to the extent that
it is responsible for disciplining public defenders) would ideally
be composed of persons other than such judges.98 Private crim-
92. Id. 8 483.01 et seq.
93. Id. § 483.01.
94. Id. 88 15A.083(3), 611.23.
95. Id. 8 611.24.
96. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.030 (1974) (judicial council); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANw. § 51-289 (Supp. 1975) (defender services commission);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4514 (1974) (board of supervisors); Mn. ANN.
CODE art. 27A, § 9 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (board of trustees); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-375 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (judicial standards commission); ORE.
Rs.v. STAT. §§ 151.270-.280 (1974) (defender committee); S.C. CODE AxN.§ 17-285 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (board of directors).
97. In Minnesota, recovery for damages caused by a state public
defender office presently could be sought before the State Tort Claims
Commission. Mmnz. STAT. § 3.735 (1) (1974). Moreover, the Minnesota su-
preme court has recently abolished sovereign immunity in the state, al-
though delaying the effect of its decision until August 1, 1976, in order to
give the state time to develop procedures to implement the ruling. Nieting
v. Blondell, __ N.W.2d - (Minn. 1975). In any event, it is desirable
that legally expert administrative tribunals of the sort proposed here be
established to hear claims against public defenders.
98. The Model Public Defender Act explicitly bars judges, prose-
cuting attorneys, and public defenders from membership on the State
Defender Commission. MODEL PuBiac DEFNmDER ACT § 10 Alternative
B (b) (1) (1974).
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inal defense attorneys are in a uniquely advantageous position
to evaluate the indigent defendant's claim of ineffective represen-
tation and would probably be the most appropriate candidates
for those bodies.
Adoption of the other reforms suggested is a relatively sim-
ple matter. Present salary levels can be increased and qualifica-
tions for prospective defenders raised, and, given adequate fund-
ing, the state judicial council or its equivalent could establish
the training procedures necessary to ensure that all attorneys
in the public defender office are capable of providing effective
representation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The only methods currently available by which indigent
criminal defendants claiming ineffective legal representation can
seek monetary relief are malpractice or section 1983 actions.
Such claims present numerous difficulties, ranging from the high
costs of litigation to the various immunity doctrines. Although
class actions seeking injunctive relief under section 1983 or claims
invoking the inherent power of the court potentially offer pro-
spective relief against the institutional problems of the defender
office, these theories do not provide compensatory relief and are
likely to be used sparingly because of considerations of federal-
state comity and judicial discretion.
These roadblocks to judicial relief indicate that any improve-
ments in the functioning of defender systems must come from
the political process. Legislative creation of an independent ad-
ministrative body with power to implement improvements in the
structure and operation of the defender office, hear complaints
of ineffective representation, award compensatory damages to in-
jured defendants, and discipline irresponsible defenders seems a
pragmatic approach for overcoming the present inadequacies of
the system.

